STA!EMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND(D-SC) ON S.2646 BEFORE INTERNAL SECURITY SUB
COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY COMMI!TEE FEBRUARY 27, 1958.
MR.

CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN:
tam pleased to have this opportunity to make a brief statement in support of
;

Senate Bill 2646, to limit the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
This is a matteli of pa.rt~ct1lar interest to me, because I have had a life-long
interest in all things pertaining to the delicate balanc~ of powers existing
between the three branches of the Federal government and between the Federal and
State $Overnments.
In the present instance, we are ~onfronted by an alarming trend on the part
of the Judicial Branch of the government, headed b~ the Supreme Court, to usurp
fieldsof · responsibility that belong elsewhere.
Not only has the Court dealt deadly blows to the Constitutional principle of
States Rights and to the law-making power of the Legislative Branch of the Federal
government, but the Court has also struck at the fundamental au.thority vested in the
Executive Bran~h • .
The time is long past due for action by the Congress to call a halt to this
unconstitutional seizure of power by the third branch of the government.
We

are confronted today by two methods by which. the Supreme Court is

undermin_tcg· oonstitutt:emal . ,geves:mnent 1c· tbie coun~ry.

The first of these methods is through seizure of power.

Although the Court

was conceived by the framers of the Constitution to be a weaker branch than the
Legislative and Executive Branches, the Court has consistently moved to expand its
powers, until it threatens to be the dominating power in the government.
Secondly, the Court has moved, perhaps unconsciously, to set itself up as
the guardian of subversive elements, encouraging these people to continue their
work against Constitutional government.
Senator Jenner's bill is a particularly timely one because it throws up a
defense for th~ Constitution against attack from both of these directions.

It

would remove from the Supreme Court some of the powers it has preempted for itself
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and for the central government.

At the same time, it would remove the protective

cloak that the Court has thrown arQund subversives.
In Watkins y. United States, the Court attempted to prescribe rules to
govern the conduct of Cohgressional investigating comnittees.

Note that this was,

in the general sense, an effort to limit the po-.,er of the Legislative Branch.

In

the specific sense, by limiting the power of Committees to investigate s~bversive
activity, it had the effect of shielding Communists.
The same pattern may be seen in Konibsberg y. California and in Schware y.
Board
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Examiners.

The broad effect of the decisions was to ~imit the power

of state governments to deny licenses to practice law.

The specific, or narrow

effect, was to secure law licenses for persons suspected of subversive activities.
Again, in Nelson y. Pennsylvania, wherein the sedition laws of 42 states
were rendered ineffective, we again find the double impact to Constitutional
government.

First, state authority was smashed down, and, simultaneously, the

rights of suspected Communists were enlarged.
The same is true in Slochower y. Board

2! Education, Yates y. California,

Service y. Dulles, and a number of other cases that have come into the purview of
this committee in its study of Senate Bill 2646.
In most of these cases, the Supreme Court has made the error of setting
itself up as a judge of character.

The cases involved persons who may or may not

have been Communists, subversives, or security risks.

In each case, the court of

the first instance had made this determination and the Supreme Court reversed the
initial decision by applying its own standards.
Now, judging character is not an easy matter.

As Justice Frankfurter wrote

in his dissenting opinion in Schware y. Board o f ~ Examiners, in which the Court
tried to satisfy itself concerning the moral character of Schware:
" ••• satisfaction of the requirement of moral character involves an
exercise of delicate judgment on the part of those who reach a con
clusion, having heard and seen the applicant for admission, a judgment
of which it may be said ••• that it expresses an 'intuition of
experience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled
impressions; impressions which may lie beneath consciousneas without
losing their worth.'"
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It is impossible for the Supreme Courh, as an appellate court, to study a
case so thoroughly and so carefully that i~ can exercise that "delicate judgment"
which is so essential to a proper determination of character.

Even if it could,

the fact that the lower court looks to the Supreme Court for precedents, means
that a set of arbitrary rules must replace judgment.
While I favor all of the provisions of the bill, I am particularly
interested in the one that would prevent the Supreme Court from reviewing cases
challenging the statutes and executive regulations of the States pertaining to
subversion against the States.

In the case of NelRon y. Pennsylvania, the Court

overturned a conviction obtained under the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which
forbids the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the Government of the United
States by force and violence, by holding that it had been superseded by the
Smith Act, a federal law forbidding the same conduct.
In effect, the Supreme Court nullified the anti-subversion laws of 42 states
by holding that the Federal government had preempted the field.
Congress never intended such an effect of the Smith Act.

As the three

dissenting justices pointed out in Nelson y. Pennsylvania:
"The Smith Act appears in Title 18 of the United States Code, and
Section 3231 provides, 'Nothing in this Title shall be held to
take away or impair the jurisdiction of the Courts of the several
states under the laws thereof ••• '"
Here is clearly another example of how central authority can needlessly
replace local authority; in fact, it would seem, the Supreme Court holds to tl;.e
notion that central authority necessarily excludes local authority from wha~ever
field, of law the central authority preempts.
This same point -- the Sedition Laws of the States -- is covered in
another bill pending before the Judiciary Committee, Senate Bill 2401.

This bill,

one introduced by me during the First Session of this Congress, also would
restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in reviewing the validity of
statutes and regulations pertaining to the operation of public schools in the
several states.

It appears to me that the last stronghold of our system of local
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the public school systems, and that, by

I

interposirig itself into a field properly occupied by State school boards and local
authorities, the Supreme Court has struck at the very foundation of Constitutional
government.
The choice we face in this country today is judicial limitation or
judicial tyranny.
Judicial limitation will strengthen the ramparts over which patriots have
watched through the generations since 1776.

Judicial tyranny will destroy

Constitutional government just as surely as ~ny other type of tyra~ny.
If the Supreme Court can assume power without rebuff, the complete tyranny
of the Judiciary is close at hand.

Then the Federal government will cease to

be federal and become national in nature, imposing its will upon the States and
local governments of this great country.
The Supreme Court must be curbed.

If it continues in the direction it is

headed, we shall all become the victims of Judicial tyranny.
END
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